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WITNESS IMMUNITY STATUTES IN ILLINOIS

-

TIME FOR A CHANGE
INTRODUCTION

The ability to determine, with some degree of certainty, the
rules by which an individual must govern his conduct is deemed
to be a fundamental right. Such certainty is guaranteed by due
process requirements' and the reason is obvious. Unless a
person can determine the duties imposed by a given law, he
cannot proceed upon any course of conduct with assurance of
the legal ramifications of such conduct. Applying this reasoning
to the history of the myriad of federal witness immunity statutes
- and unfortunately, present day practice in most of the states,
including Illinois - one wonders why they have not been subject
to numerous due process attacks. The reason is that much of
the uncertainty as to the requirements of any given immunity
provision has resulted from prior judicial treatment of other
similar provisions. Judicial construction has been conflicting
and often does not reflect the apparent meaning of the statute
being construed.2 The confusion is heightened by the fact that
there are numerous variations in language among immunity provisions which were apparently intended to accomplish the same
effect - all within the same jurisdiction.
STATUTORY IMMUNITY GENERALLY

The fifth amendment guarantees that "[n] o person .. shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
." However, it was early recognized that this right was not
to be applied literally, 4 and thus, whenever the danger at which
this protection is directed is removed - that of being forced to
convict oneself out of his own mouth - the bar against compul1
Statutes which are so incomplete, vague, indefinite and uncertain
that men of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at their meaning and differ as to their application, have uniformly been declared
unconstitutional as denying due process. . . . For a statute to be held
valid the duty imposed by it must be prescribed in terms definite enough
to serve as a guide to those who have the duty imposed upon them.
People ex rel. Duffy v. Hurley, 402 Ill. 562, 567, 85 N.E.2d 26, 28-9 (1949).
2 As where the requirement of claim of privilege is implied, by the court.
See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
3 For

4

variations in Illinois, see note 16 infra.

In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the Supreme Court

ruled on the validity of a witness immunity statute for the first time. The
Court struck down a statute which barred only the use of compelled testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the witness. In dictum,
however, the Court recognized that the government could by statutory authority compel self-incriminating testimony, if the statute barred prosecution
of the witness for any matter about which he may have testified. Such a
statute was later upheld in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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sion is also removed.; Witness immunity statutes have as their
purpose the removal of this danger, so that the government may
compel testimony over claims of the privilege against self-incrimination. The constitutional test of the validity of such a
6
statute is that it be coextensive with the scope of the privilege.
Anything less and the statute will fall as unconstitutional, or in
the few instances where it is saved, will fall short of its purpose
of compelling testimony.,
In 1972, the supposed requirement of transactional immunity
- that an individual be given complete protection from prosecution for a matter about which he is compelled to testify or
produce evidence 8 - yielded to a use and derivative use standard
which affords much narrower protection." In Kastigarv. United
States,10 the Supreme Court held that it was constitutionally

permissible for a witness to be convicted for a matter about
which he has been compelled to testify, the only limitationbeing
that the Government may not use the compelled evidence or
evidence derived therefrom for his prosecution.The wisdom of this change of protection - wrought by the
1970 Federal Act 2 which Kastigarupheld - is outside the scope
of this article."3 Rather, the improvement in federal immunity
5 In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the Court, in upholding the
validity of an immunity statute, stated:
The interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a
witness is asked to incriminate himself, - in other words, to give
testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if
the criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to
apply.
Id. at 67. Thus, also, where prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations, pardon, or double jeopardy, the privilege does not apply. See

McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 121 (2d ed. 1972).

6 That the statute leave "the witness and the prosecutorial authorities
in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth
"-Amendment privilege." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972).
7See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
8 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See note 4 supra.
9 See Note, Kastigar v. United States: Compulsory Witness Immunity
and the Fifth Amendment, 6 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & .PRoc. 120 (1972), for
a discussion as to the change in requirements for a valid immunity statute
and the background that preceded that change.
10 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
"
This burden of proof .

.

. is not limited to a negation of taint;

rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.
Id. at 460.
The burden is substantial and it would be wise for the government to
certify their evidence against a witness before compelling him to testify.
Goldberg v. United States, 472 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1973). See Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82
YALE L.J. 171 (1972), cited in the latter case, for a recommended procedure.
12 The Organized Crime Control Act, Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, tit. II, § 201(a), 84 STAT. 926, added Part V (§§ 6001-6005), Immunity of Witnesses, to Title 18, United States Code [hereinafter cited as
the Federal Act].
13 Criticism has focused on the lesser protection afforded the witness
and the opportunity for government abuse. E.g., Kastigar v. United States,
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law which the Federal Act effected will serve as the backdrop for
an exploration of the present ambiguous state of Illinois immunity law.
THE FEDERAL ACT AND ITS BACKGROUND

The Federal Act wiped away more than fifty separate immunity statutes under which various units of the federal government had previously operated. 4 The superficial benefit of a
unified single system of immunity is obvious. When one considers the utter lack of conformity among federal statutes prior
to this Act and still in effect in most states, the improvement
is better appreciated. Some statutes were self-executing (no
court order required) ; others were not. Some were automatic
(the witness need not first claim his privilege) ; some (the claim
acts) were not. In some oath and/or subpoena were requisites
to immunity; in others, one or the other was not. Further, there
were requirements as to the type of proceeding and subject
matter of the investigation under each provision. The confusion was accentuated by incidents of vague language in the
statutes as to whether oath, subpoena, claim of privilege, or
particular proceedings were required, and the resultant conflicting judicial holdings on each of these points.
Witnesses confronted by these statutes had to proceed with
the greatest caution, the burden in most instances falling on the
witness - not the Government - to insure strict compliance
with the statute. Failure to do so resulted in no protection for
testimony given, while compliance often required the witness to
subject himself to contempt proceedings. Occasionally, a witness who had followed all procedures set out in the immunity
provision found himself without immunity because the court
implied additional requirements of which the provision itself
made no mention. Particularly dangerous was relying on assurances of immunity or succumbing to threats of punishment
for contempt where a government attorney, armed with some
immunity provision, confronted the unwilling witness. The
immunity statute can be a potent prosecutorial weapon, capable
406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (dissenting opinion) - Lewis, The Practical Defender: On Use Immunity, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 1972, Vol. 7, No. 4; and
Note cited in note 9 supra.
Similarly, the thrust of the attack on immunity statutes prior to
Kastiqar had been based on the deprivation against self-incrimination.
Justice Douglas' view is that it is "beyond the power of Congress to compel
anyone to confess his crimes." Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 442, 445
(1956) (dissenting opinion).
14 For a detailed breakdown of federal immunity provisions, as outlined
immediately below, and a comprehensive discussion of federal immunity, law
prior to the Federal Act, see Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts
in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE

L.J. 1568 (1963).
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of abuse, where its requirements are not clear. Against this
background - which persists under Illinois law - the Federal
Act, while not perfect, is notable for its clarity of procedural
requirements which the witness must meet before immunity will
attach.".
IMMUNITY IN ILLINOIS

Illinois has no such clear, uniform immunity procedure' Illinois law being comparable to that which existed under prior
federal law with all its attendant uncertainty. There has been
little litigation concerning immunity statutes in Illinois. How-

ever, the recent case of People v. Crawford Distributing Co."
emphasizes many of the problems of a haphazard system of
vague immunity provisions and is indicative of a narrow judicial
view toward grants of immunity.
In Crawford the Illinois Supreme Court had before it the
15 § 6002, Immunity Generally, provides:

Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to (1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses,
or a committee or subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the
witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to
comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order
(or any information directly or indirectly 'derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal
case. ...
Thus, claim of privilege and an order thereafter are the requisites to immunity. Subpoena and oath are irrelevant.
16 There are no less than 19 separate immunity provisions in Illinois.
All but one, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.7 (1971), which will be analyzed
in detail infra, grant transactional immunity. The others are listed below
according to their express requirements.
The following provisions require oath and subpoena: ILL. REV.
REV. STAT. ch. 5, §158 (Marketing Fresh Fruits and Vegetables); ch.
43, §163d (Liquor Control Act) ; ch. 67%, §173 (State Housing Act);
ch. 671/2, §278 (Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Act) ; ch.
111 2 /, §65 (Illinois Commerce Commission) ; ch. 120, §9-915 (Income
Tax Act) ; ch. 120, §448 (Retailers' Occupation Tax Act) ; ch. 120,
§453.10a (Cigarette Tax Act) ; ch. 120, §453.49 (Cigarette Use Tax
Act) ; ch. 120, §467.9 (Messages Tax Act) ; ch. 120, §467.24 (Gas
Revenue Tax Act) ; ch. 120, §476 (Public Utilities Revenue Act).
The following requires oath, subpoena, and claim of privilege:
ch. 48, §501 (Unemployment Compensation Act).
The following requires claim of privilege and court order: ch. 63,
§315 (Legislative Investigating Commission Act).
The following requires claim of privilege: ch. 73, §1040 (Insurance
Code).
The following requires court order: ch. 38, §106 (Grand Jury
investigations and trial court).
The following requires oath: ch. 100%A, §4 (Public Nuisance answering interrogatories).
The following requires that testimony or production of documents be
"compelled": ch. 73, §765 (Insurance Code).
17 53 Ill. 2d 332, 291 N.E.2d 648 (1973).
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immunity provision of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 8 which in
relevant part provides:
In any investigation brought by the Attorney General pursuant to this Act, no individual shall be excused from attending,
testifying or producing documentary material, objects or tangible
things in obedience to a subpoena or under order of the court on the
ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend
to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty. No individual
shall be criminally prosecuted or subjected to any criminal penalty
under this Act for or on account of any testimony given by him
in any investigation brought by the Attorney General pursuant to
this Act; provided no individual so testifying shall be exempt from
prosecution or punishment for perjury committed in so testifying."

The Act further gives the Attorney General authority prior

to the commencement of any judicial action, to subpoena witnesses and documents. 20 If a witness refuses to obey the subpoena or give testimony pursuant thereto, the Attorney General
may petition the court for an order requiring compliance under
threat of contempt proceedings.21
Involved in Crawford was a subpoena duces tecum which had
been directed to seven corporations, ordering the production of
corporate documents in an investigation under the Antitrust
Act. The subpoenas stated that neither personal appearance of
corporate officers nor their testimony was required. The officers
complied, and some made unsworn statements in answer to questions put by representatives of the Attorney General. Later, the
corporations and six of their officers were indicted for antitrust
violations. The trial court, interpreting the statute as granting
18 ILL. RFV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as the
Antitrust Act].
19 Id. § 60-7.7.
20 Id.
§ 60-7.2, Investigation by Attorney General, provides:
Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that any person has
engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in any act or practice
prohibited by this Act, or that any person has assisted or participated
In any agreement or combination of the nature described herein, he may,
in his discretion, conduct an investigation as he deems necessary in connection with the matter and has the authority prior to the commencement
of any civil or criminal action as provided for in the Act to subpoena
witnesses, compel their attendance, examine them under oath, or require
the production of any books, documents, records, writings or tangible
things hereafter referred to as 'documentary material' which the Attorney General deems relevant or material to his investigation ....
21 Id. § 60-7.6, Failure or Refusal to Obey Subpoena, provides:
In the event a witness served with a subpoena by the Attorney General under this Act fails or refuses to obey same or produce documentary
material as provided herein, or to give testimony, relevant or material,
to the investigation being conducted, the Attorney General may petition
the Circuit Court of Sangamon or Cook County, or the county wherein
the witness resides for an order requiring said witness to attend and
testify or produce the documentary material demanded; thereafter, any
failure or refusal on the part of the witness to obey such order of court
may be punishable by the court as a contempt thereof.
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transactional immunity, dismissed the 22indictments as to the
officers based upon a claim of immunity.
On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
trial court, declaring that the Act grants only use and derivative
use immunity, and confers no immunity on witnesses who produce corporate documents or who make unsworn statements to
Attorney General's representatives aside from judicial proceedings. The court did not rest its decision on any specific grounds;
it is apparent that the court was in no way restricted in its
holding by the facts of the case. Nevertheless, Crawford indicates a judicial policy to restrict as much as is constitutionally
possible the extent of immunity granted in exchange for selfincriminating testimony,23 and at the same time appears to
place every possible obstacle in the way of a person's obtaining
any protection. As such, it is indicative of the uncertainty a
witness faces when confronted with an unclear immunity provision.
The Crawford opinion is also troublesome because of its
ambiguity as to exactly what is required of a witness in order for
immunity to attach and its failure to relate the language of the
statute under consideration to the facts of the case - instead
relying on federal cases which dealt with substantially different
statutes. Typically, the problem is complicated by the fact that
the immunity provision of the Antitrust Act differs from the
immunity provisions of all other Illinois statutes. Reading the
opinion and statute together it would seem that:
1. In no case does the production of documents entitle an
individual to immunity.
2. Strict compliance with the statute is necessary for immunity to attach, and the burden is on the witness to inquire
into and insist upon the regularity of the proceedings.
3. A witness must assert his privilege against self-incrimination after being subpoenaed, and then be ordered by the
court to testify.
As was the case under prior federal law, other ambiguities
2. The trial court also held the statute invalid as violative of separation
of powers in that it vested in the executive branch the power to issue sub-

poenas aside from judicial proceedings.

The Illinois Supreme Court found

no merit in this point. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1953).
28 The Antitrust Act states that "[a]o individual shall be criminally
prosecuted . . . on account of any testimony given by him . . . ." while
other Illinois immunity provisions state "on account of any transaction . . .
concerning which he may testify." In view of the difference in language,
the court was on firm ground in its interpretation of the antitrust provision
as granting narrower protection.
However, it is noteworthy that the Illinois provision was enacted prior
to the Federal Act and Kastigar, and comments subsequent to its passage
indicate that it could be interpreted as granting transactional immunity. ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.7 (Smith-Hurd Annot. ed. 1973).
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are inherent in the Act itself. Though not touched upon by the
Crawford opinion, they are vitally important to the witness in
view of the court's cautious attitude toward granting immunity.

These problems are:
1. Whether only questions relevant to the antitrust investigation and responsive answers thereto by the witness invoke

the immunity provided.
2.

At what point in the procedures outlined in the Act may

the witness step forward to protect himself.
3.

Whether immunity extends only to violations of the

24
Antitrust Act.

Documentary Evidence
That the defendants in Crawford could not sustain their
claim of immunity on the basis of production of corporate

documents is not a very startling proposition. 25 It is traditional
doctrine that production of such documents will not activate an
immunity provision. 2 6

This is so even in the face of broad

statutory language (not present in this case) providing that no
person shall be prosecuted on account of any documentary evidence he has been compelled to produce. Such holdings proceed

from the premise that immunity statutes are to be construed, so
far as their words permit, as coterminous with what otherwise
27
would have been the privilege of the person concerned.
The privilege against self-incrimination extends only to the
compelled production of private papers or papers in one's possession in a purely personal capacity.2 8 Corporations have no
such privilege. 29 Nor does a corporate officer as to corporate
documents in his custody, even though he has made the incrimi24 It is to be emphasized that most of these problems are equally applicable to other Illinois immunity provisions and will be discussed in that context
below. The discussion centers on Crwford and the Antitrust Act since it
is the only recent Illinois case dealing with the problems, and the case
appears to indicate a narrower view of immunity than prior cases Illinois or federal.
25 One of the defendants in Crawford claimed immunity on the basis
that he had presented personal records with the corporate records required
by subpoena. The court dismissed the argument since the personal records
were neither identified as such nor called for, and therefore were to be
considered as corporate records. 53 Ill. 2d at 343, 291 N.E.2d at 654. To
the same effect, see United States v. Consumers Ice Co., 84 F. Supp. 46
(W.D. La. 1949).
28
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
2
THeike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142 (1913). Such would seem
to be a fair description of the attitude of the Crawford court with ragard
to all aspects of immunity. However, the United States Supreme Court
refused to extend this reasoning to other aspects of immunity statutes in
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943). See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
28 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) ; Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361 (1911); cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
29 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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nating entries; the justification being that with respect to corporate matters, an officer cannot be said to hold the records in
30
any personal capacity.
This rather elementary point is examined here for two
reasons. First, the only Illinois decision on the point took a very
broad view of immunity for the production of nonprivileged
material. In People v. Finkelstein31 the Illinois Appellate Court
had before it a statute which provided immunity "for, or on
account of, any transaction made or thing concerning which he
may testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise ... 32
The court first stated that immunity statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of the witness," and then concluded that the
statute was "so plain and unambiguous that it requires no judicial interpretation," - defendants were entitled to immunity.4
This case appears to be one of a kind. In view of the great
body of better reasoned authority contra,"5 Finkelstein will
probably never be followed.
The second reason for exploring the area of nonprivileged
documents is that Crawford cannot, strictly speaking, be said to
have overruled Finkelstein. The Antitrust Act by its terms
extends immunity only to testimony and confers no immunity
for the production of documentary evidence.'6 In this regard
it is different from all other Illinois statutes and immunity provisions generally, including the Federal Act.
Such a change in the government's power to reach incriminating evidence through a grant of immunity is at once an aid
and a hindrance, and illustrates the competing factors involved
in providing for statutory immunity. On the one hand, the
power to investigate is obviously restricted. But on the other,
this restriction prevents any unexpected grants of immunity to
the producing witness. This last consideration has less force
where a use and derivative use provision is involved and seems
somewhat inconsistent in that all other Illinois provisions grant
(1911).
The principle also
30 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
applies to any records required to be kept by law. Id. It has also been
extended to impersonal, unincorporated organizations, such as labor unions.

United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).

But not to partnerships.

In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
3 299 Ill. App. 363, 20 N.E.2d 290 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 372

II. 186, 23 N.E.2d 34 (1939).

32 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 448 (1971).
33 This statement appears often in the cases but is seldom applied.

'4 299 Ill. App. at 381, 20 N.E.2d at 297.
35E.g., see notes 26-30 supra.
36 See Antitrust Act. § 60-7.7, note 19 supra and accompanying text.
Further, the Attorney General has no authority to subpoena privileged
documents. Id. § 60-7.2.
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transactional immunity, while giving the government power to
subpoena privileged documentary evidence.
Procedural Formalities - Witness Beware!
The immunity provision of the Antitrust Act provides that
"[n]o individual shall be criminally prosecuted . . .on account
of any testimony given by him in any investigation ... pursuant

to this Act.

. . .,13

Another provision of the Act requires that:

The examination of all witnesses under this section shall
be conducted by the Attorney General or by an assistant attorney
general designated by him before an officer authorized to administer oaths in this State. The testimony .. .shall be transcribed.39
Thus, reading these two provisions together, it could be
concluded that testimony under oath is a prerequisite to immunity. On the other hand, the immunity provision itself
(§ 60-7.7) does not explicitly require oath or other procedural
formalities, and thus could easily mislead the witness. In effect,
the question is whether the procedural formalities required are
restrictions on the government or the witness. Therefore, it
would be as reasonable (and fairer to the witness) to place the
burden of enforcing formalities not expressed in the immunity
provision itself on the government. Such was the result of a
federal case under similar circumstances, 40 which prompted Congress in the same year to amend federal provisions to expressly require that no witness could qualify for immunity absent
oath and subpoena.41 The Crawford opinion fails to detail the
court's reasoning in arriving at its conclusion on this matter,
nor does it analyze provisions of the Antitrust Act. Instead, the
court relies on three federal decisions, in none of which was the
issue of sworn testimony presented, and in each of which the
relevant statute expressly required oath and subpoena.42
Implicit in Crawford's holding is the requirement that the
burden of insuring that all procedural requirements are met before the witness answers any questions falls solely on the witness
and not the government. This is so even though the requirements
may be scattered throughout the act which contains the immunity
provision, and therefore may not seem to be requisites to immunity, and though the government is in a much better position
37 One questions at this point whether the provision was intended to
grant only use and derivative use immunity.
38 § 60-7.7, set out in full at note 19 supra (emphasis added).
39 § 60-7.4.
40 United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1902).
41 Act of Feb. 25, 1903, ch. 3920, 34 Stat. 798.
42 United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943) ; see note 62 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case. Sherwin v. United States,
268 U.S. 369 (1924); see note 48 infra and accompanying text. United
States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95 (1964) ; see note 46 infra and accompanying
text.
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to know and implement these requirements. The theory which
underlies the insistence upon strict compliance with all statutory
formalities is that absent such compliance, there is simply no
jurisdiction to confer immunity. Thus, the question which the
court must decide becomes not upon whom the burden of
meeting these formalities rests, but what formalities are conditions precedent to immunity.
The cautious witness, therefore, must survey the act as a
whole, and not rely on the immunity provision within that act.
In addition to subpoena and oath, it would seem that under the
Antitrust Act the witness should insist that his testimony be
officially transcribed. 43 Of course, even if not required, a record
of his testimony in some form will be necessary for the witness
to prevail when he later asserts his claim of immunity. Further,
all immunity provisions contemplate some specific type of proceeding, such as an administrative hearing or a court or grand
jury proceeding. Under the Antitrust Act, it is necessary that
the official conducting the examination be the Attorney General
or an assistant attorney general designated by him. 44 Thus, the
witness may even have to be certain of the authority of his investigators.
The consequences of failing to insist upon strict compliance
with formalities, though such are not clearly specified in the
immunity provision itself, are reflected in the federal cases also.' 5
In United States v. Welden 46 defendants testified before a congressional committee in obedience to subpoena and were later
indicated for matters concerning their testimony. The Court held
4
that the immunity provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act, '
which granted immunity without court order for testimony
given in any proceeding under the Act, was inapplicable since
that act contemplated only judicial proceedings.
In Sherwin v. United States4 8 the defendants furnished information to an agent of the Federal Trade Commission. The
Commission had previously written letters requesting information and upon the defendants' refusal to comply, the agent insisted that failure to furnish the information would subject the
defendants to criminal penalties under the immunity provisions
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 9 Defendants furnished
43 See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
44Id.
45See also United States v. Brennan, 214 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
and Phelps v. United States, 160 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 860 (1948).
46377 U.S. 95 (1964).

47 Act of Feb. 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904.
48268 U.S. 369 (1925).

49Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 10, 38 Stat. 717, 723.
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the requested information, and the court held that they were not
entitled to immunity in that they had not testified before the
Commission itself in obedience to subpoena, as provided by the

Act.
Occasionally, the witness has been afforded a measure of
protection where government attorneys have, by their affirmative conduct, mislead the witness. 5" In Cannan v. United Statesj
on facts almost identical to those of Sherwin set out above,52 the
court disallowed defendant's claim of immunity (citing Sherivin), but excluded the evidence which formed the basis of defendant's immunity plea. The court stated:
The documents furnished under these circumstances were in the
nature of confessions, and were relied on by the government
to prove defendant's guilt. The question whether these documentary confessions were voluntary is not influenced by the immunity provision of the statute, but is to be determined by the
ordinary rule of evidence applicable to confessions in criminal
cases. The threat was made by an official body that had power
and authority to institute a prosecution.
No confession induced by official threat of prosecution [for
contempt] is voluntary. 53
Further, in Illinois, if the conduct of the prosecutor (state's
attorney 4) can be construed as a promise of immunity, the courts
will enforce that promise.-- This is true notwithstanding the
rule that authority to remove the privilege in exchange for a
grant of immunity lies solely in legislative enactment.56 The
enforceability of the promise is grounded on a policy that it
would not be in the state's best interest to ignore the promise
where the witness proceeded to give evidence in reliance upon
50 Such cases are difficult to find in the context of immunity statutes.
Further, establishing a coerced confession so as to invoke the exclusionary
rule is, of course, practically more difficult than sustaining a proper immunity
plea under statute; and the protection afforded by the exclusionary rule falls
tar short of transactional immunity, which still predominates in Illinois.
51 19 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1927).
52 The only difference, as reported in the cases, is that in Sherwin the
threat of prosecution was oral and not written.
53 19 F.2d at 824. In People v. Heide, 302 I1. 624, 135 N.E. 77 (1922),
the court said:
The rule is that a confession obtained under any promise or hope of
immunity is not admissible in evidence. Such a confession is not voluntary, where any degree of influence is used to obtain it by a person hav-

ing authority over the crime charged . . . [A] confession becomes in-

competent whenever any degree of influence has been exerted by any
person having authority over the charge against the prisoner or over his
person, tending to cause duress or hope of leniency, for the reason that
the law presumes that such confession was prompted by that influence.
Id. at 627-28, 135 N.E. at 78-9.
54 With respect to prosecutions under the Antitrust Act, the Attorney
General has all powers that a state's attorney has generally. § 60-6.
55 Illinois is in the minority on this point.
E.g., Whiskey Cases, 99
U.S. 594 (1878); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 143 (2d ed. 1972).

56 People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964); People v.
Rockola, 339 Ill. 474, 171 N.E. 559, 69 A.LR. 852 (1930).
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However, given the cautious judicial attitude toward grants
of immunity, it is difficult to see how the witness could successfully establish his reliance on the prosecutor's promise or on his
misleading conduct, where the latter had asserted his authority
to grant immunity based on statute. More likely, the court would
find reliance on the statute, which would necessitate strict compliance with its requirements.
Even assuming that the witness may obtain a measure of protection in circumstances where some affirmative conduct on the
part of the government has led the witness astray, he nevertheless remains in a difficult position. The government is free
to stand by and let the witness make his own mistakes when
faced with some vague immunity provision. There are good
reasons to insist on compliance with all procedural requirements
before immunity attach, lest a witness attempt to confer immunity on himself by voluntarily appearing and answering questions in some investigation. There is no reason short of an intention to mislead the witness or sloppy draftsmanship to disguise the requirements and spatter them throughout the statute.
Further, the reason behind insisting on strict compliance with
the formalities loses its force where the witness is first required
to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, thus putting
the government on notice that the witness will not testify without a grant of immunity.5 8
it.

To Claim or Not To Claim?
The most troublesome and ambiguous aspect of Crawford
and of immunity provisions generally lies in the degree of legal
compulsion needed to invoke the immunity provisions. Crawford
indicated that immunity will not attach aside from judicial proceedings. The only provision of the Antitrust Act which calls
for judicial involvement lies in the Attorney General's power to
petition the court for an order requiring a witness who has refused to obey a subpoena or give testimony to do so under threat
of contempt. 59 Thus, it seems that absent a witness's refusal to
obey a subpoena - presumably on grounds of self-incrimination
and then being ordered by the court to comply, the witness
could acquire no immunity, since there had been no judicial
proceeding.
Such a construction strains, if not changes, the plain meanPeople v. Bogolowski, 326 Ill. 253, 157 N.E. 181 (1927).
58 Generally, the federal cases reflect an insistence upon strict compli57

ance with procedural formalities only when dealing with statutes which do
not require claim of privilege. See Note cited at note 11 supra; Comment,
Automatic Witness Immunity Statutes and the Inadvertent Frustrationof
Criminal Prosecutions: A Call for Congressional Action, 55 GEo. L.J. 656
(1967).
59

§ 60-7.6, set out in full at note 21 supra.
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ing of the Act's immunity provision - that "no individual shall
be excused from ...testifying . . . in obedience to subpoena or
under order of the court" on grounds of self-incrimination, and
that "no individual shall be criminally prosecuted ... on account
of any testimony given by him in any investigation brought...
pursuant to this Act. . .. "6 In response to a federal statute,'
which, like the Antitrust Act, did not mention any necessity to
claim privilege, the United States Supreme Court held in United
States v. Monia12 that the terms of immunity were clear and no
refusal to testify on grounds of self-incrimination was required.
The Monia Court further stated that an opposite interpretation
would in effect be a trap to the witness.13 In so holding, Monia
resolved a conflict of authority among the federal circuits, sev64
eral of which had held that claim of privilege was necessary.
Their reasoning was that immunity provisions were to be interpreted as coterminous with the scope of the privilege, and of
"
course, the privilege must be asserted or it is deemed waived.6
There are cogent reasons for requiring the witness to claim
his privilege before immunity may attach, though there may be
no good reason not to set this out clearly in the statute. If a
statute is automatic, the prosecutor is at an obvious disadvantage,
since he may not know whether or to what extent a witness may
have participated in a crime, and thus runs the risk of unintentionally conferring immunity. And thus, provided the witness
knows of a claim requirement, it is not unfair to require him to
assert his privilege and thereby put the prosecutor on notice
that if he insists upon testimony, the witness will obtain immunity.""
Immunity for All Testimony?
The immunity provision of the Antitrust Act, and immunity provisions generally,1 present another serious problem
§ 60-7.7, set out in text accompanying note 19 supra (emphasis added).
61 Act of Feb. 25, 1903, ch. 755, 32 Stat. 854, 904.
62 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
63
Id. at 430.
64 A list of these holdings appears in Monia. Id. at 425, n.2.
65 Thus, if Crawford does in fact require claim of privilege, its holding
is not without some support. However, it should be reemphasized that the
requirement of claim is only implicit in the court's express holding that there
is no immunity for testimony aside from judicial proceedings.
Perhaps
the court meant only that a witness must comply strictly with procedural
60

formalities - oath, subpoena, transcription, etc. Such is "judicial-like" and
may have been what the court had in mind. However, to so interpret the court's
holding would require assigning a strained definition to "judicial proceedings." Further, in dealing with another issue in the case, the court clearly
used the term as synonymous with "court proceeding." See note 22 supra.
06 See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. at 427. H.R. REP. No. 2606,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), U.S. CONG. CODE AND AD. NEWS at 3059.
67 All immunity provisions in Illinois relate to a distinct type of investigation. See note 16 supra.
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for an individual seeking to bring himself within the scope of
immunity. Though Crawford did not reach the problem, it

merits discussion as another hidden trap for the witness, especially in light of the court's narrow interpretation of immunity.
Once the witness has otherwise met all the procedural formalities - oath, subpoena, proper proceeding, claim - he still may
find his testimony has not activated an immunity provision if it
strays too far from the proper subject matter of the investigation. This is a three-pronged problem. First, the investigation
itself must be within the subject matter of the relevant statute.
Second, questions asked by the government in a proper investigation must relate to that investigation. Third, the witness's
answers must be responsive to the questions. 8
Subject Matter of the Investigation
Under the Antitrust Act, the Attorney General has authority
to bring an investigation concerning only violations of that Act. 69
Thus, if the investigation fails to meet this subject matter requirement, the immunity provision is inapplicable.7 0 This is so
even though a court has issued an order upon petition of the
Attorney General directing the witness to testify7l - the reason
being that the court has no jurisdiction to issue an immunity
order without statutory authority, and the order must therefore
68 Clearly a witness's answers must relate to the question asked, and he is
not permitted to immunize himself by volunteering testimony. See Marcus
v. United States, 310 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 944
(1963) ; People v. Boyle, 312 Ill. 586, 144 N.E. 342 (1924); ef. People v.
Crawford Distributing Co., 53 Ill. 2d 332, 291 N.E.2d 648 (1973).
Only one Illinois immunity provision expressly requires responsive
answers: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100%,, §. 4 (1971).
In Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472
(1972), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an immunity statute which
by its terms conferred immunity only as to Iresponsive" testimony. Appellant contended that the responsiveness limitation was so vague as to be
violative of due process. The Court held that the term, as construed by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey to protect the witness against answers he in
good faith believed were demanded, was valid. The Court also stated: "The
responsiveness limitation is not a trap for the unwary; rather it is a barrier
to those who would intentionally tender information not sought in an effort
to frustrate and prevent criminal prosecution." Id. at 477.
69 § 60-7.2, set out in full at note 20 supra. All Illinois provisions (see
note 16 s upra) relate to some specific type of investigation or proceeding, and
thus are similarly restrictive.
70 E.g., In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971); In re Vericker,
446 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1971); Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d 143 (3d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 944 (1963) ; People v. Rockola, 346 Ill. 27,
178 N.E. 384 (1931) ; People v. Boyle, 312 Ill. 586, 144 N.E. 342 (1924)
People v. Newmark, 312 Ill. 625, 144 N.E. 338 (1924).
71 In People v. Newmark, 312 Ill. 625, 144 N.E. 338 (1924),
the court
in construing a statute which granted immunity in bribery investigations,
stated:
If the prosecution is for some offense other than the charge of bribery
the statute does not give the court authority to grant the witness immunity. An immunity order entered pursuant to the statute would not
protect the witness from prosecution for offenses revealed which were
in no way connected with the charge of bribery being investigated.
Id. at 631, 144 N.E. at 340.
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be void.72 Where a subject matter problem arises, the witness
has several options. He may move to quash the subpoena; intervene in the Attorney General's petition for a court order; or
await contempt proceedings for failure to comply with an order.7 3
The subject matter problem is not likely to arise 74 but a closely
related problem is.
Relevancy of Questioning
It is clear that just as the Attorney General (or other government official or agency under other statutes) has no authority
to bring an investigation not within the subject matter prescribed
by statute, he also has no power to demand answers to questions
not related to the investigation.7 5 In effect, the burden of relevancy is thrown upon the witness and he must weigh each
question and determine whether it shows any relation to a
violation under the Act. If not, and his answer may be incriminating, he must assert his privilege and refuse to answer. If
instead, the witness answers, he is entitled to no protection as to
78
that answer.
The witness, once having refused to answer on grounds of
irrelevancy (that is, on grounds of self-incrimination since immunity does not attach to irrelevant testimony), must subject
himself to contempt proceedings to prove his point if the At77
torney General disagrees with his analysis of the question.
There is federal authority to the effect that immunity attaches to any testimony responsive to questions asked, and that
it is the task of the government attorneys to ensure that the
witness is not given immunity any broader than necessary.,,
These cases proceed upon the premise that the witness cannot
72 To the effect that a court order to testify over witness's objection is
grounds for exclusion of the evidence subsequently revealed and its fruits,
see note 83 infra and accompanying text.
7 See notes 80-89 infra and accompanying text for procedures available to the witness.
7 Primarily, the problem arose under federal statutes granting automatic immunity (no claim of privilege required). There was such a statute
for practically every federal agency, and witnesses who testified before one
of these agencies and were later prosecuted often attempted to invoke one
of the statutes as an "afterthought." Today, the problem may arise in a
wide ranging grand jury investigation.
75 People v. Rockola, 346 I1. 27, 178 N.E. 384 (1931); People v. Boyle,
312 Ill. 586, 144 N.E. 342 (1924) ;People v. Newmark, 312 Ill. 625, 144 N.E.
338 (1924). See language of Antitrust Act, § 60-7.2, note 20 supra.
76 People v. Rockola, 346 Ill. 27, 178 N.E. 384. (1931) ; People v. Boyle,
312 Ill. 586, 144 N.E. 342 (1924) ; People v. Newmark, 312 Ill. 625, 144 N.E.
338 (1924).
77 This contemplates that the witness has already been ordered by the
court to testify.
78 Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 944 (1963). See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Giancana, 352
F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965) ; cf. United
States v. Weinberg, 65 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 675
(1933). Contra, Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972).
In Marcus the court stated:
[S]o soon as he testifies, under compulsion of the Court's order, he will
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control the scope of the investigation or challenge the relevancy
of questions, which proposition clearly has no support in Illinois."9
Nevertheless, placing the burden on the government to control
the scope and relevancy of the investigation, so that any testimony responsive to the government's inquiries will activate an
immunity provision, seems only fair. The fact that theoretically
the legislature has granted no authority to confer immunity
where questioning strays from the required subject matter of
the investigation need not be controlling. Such theory is a result
of judicial construction. Thus, the courts could instead construe
immunity provisions as granting authority to confer immunity
once the general "subject matter of the investigation" requirement is met.
When Must a Witness Assert His Objections?

The question remains at what point in the proceedings a
witness may raise his objections. The Antitrust Act and immunity provisions generally specify no set procedure, but do
specify two points at which the courts become involved - on
petition for an order seeking compliance, and contempt proceedings. If, at the outset, the witness has claimed his privilege and
forced the Attorney General to obtain a court order, any subse-

quent refusal to answer questions will potentially subject him
to contempt proceedings. 80 At this point he may assert his objections as to the subject matter of the investigation or to the
relevancy of questions asked. 8'

If the court sustains his objec-

tions, he will avoid a citation for contempt. If the court rules
adversely, finding him in contempt, his choice is not so clear.

Illinois decisions suggest that the witness must appeal and cannot
rely on the lower court's ruling as to relevancy; if the ruling is

erroneous, immunity will not attach.8 2

Such a result, while

automatically receive immunity . . . so long as his testimony is not

volunteered but is elicited by questions which the Court has ordered him
to answer.

.

.

. It is of course the task of the government attorneys to

ensure that the witness is not given an immunity broader than is
necessary ....

310 F.2d at 148.
7 People v. Rockola, 346 Ill. 27, 178 N.E. 384 (1931); People v. Boyle,
312 Ill. 586, 144 N.E. 342 (1924) ; People v. Newmark, 312 11. 625, 144 N.E.
338 (1924).
80 Whatever right the witness may have needs no more protection than
that afforded by the court where the witness refuses to answer and contempt
proceedings are brought. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1073
(9th Cir. 1972) ; In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631, 637, n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; In re
McElrath, 248 F.2d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; cf. Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940).
81 People v. Rockola, 346 Ill. 27, 178 N.E. 384 (1931) ; People v. Boyle,
312 Ill. 586, 144 N.E. 342 (1924) ; People v. Newmark, 312 Ill. 625, 144 N.E.
338 (1924).
82 People v. Newmark, 312 Ill. 625, 144 N.E. 338 (1924).
See People v.
Rockola, 346 Il. 27, 178 N.E. 384 (1931) ; People v. Boyle, 312 Ill. 586, 144
N.E. 342 (1924).
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consistent with the idea that the court has no authority to confer
immunity aside from legislative enactment, seems harsh.
One federal appellate court circumvented the problem. In
Ellis v. United States3 the trial judge had erroneously overruled
a witness's claim of privilege, and the witness then testified to
avoid being found in contempt. The Ellis court, citing dicta
from a United States Supreme Court case, 4 held that whenever
testimony is elicited over the witness' objection under threat of
contempt proceedings, neither that evidence nor its fruits may
constitutionally be admitted into evidence.8 5 Such exclusion,
however, is unlikely to be an acceptable alternative to the witness
testifying under a transactional immunity provision.
As to other opportunities to be heard, two federal cases
hold that the witness has an opportunity to be heard on objections to the subject matter of the investigation upon the court's
hearing of the Government's request for a court order.,, In one
the court held the witness was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process, 8 7 while the other
proceeded on the basis of right of intervention under statute.""
Both cases indicated, however, that the only question at this
hearing was as to procedural regularity of the Government's
F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Ellis cited Adams v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 179
(1954), wherein the Court stated: "Indeed, a witness does not need any
statute to protect him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is
compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth Amendment takes care of
that without a statute." Id. at 181.
85 After establishing this point, the court indicated that courts had no authority absent statute to grant immunity. The effect of its ruling, however, is
that a court may grant use and derivative use immunity via an erroneous order to testify over witness's claim of privilege. The court admitted that the
matter was "not free from doubt" and could cite no case on point. 416 F.2d
at 795.
Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1075 (9th Cir. 1972) and In re
Vericker, 446 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1971), in dictum, both drew the same
conclusion as Ellis did.
86 There are no Illinois decisions on whether the witness has an opportunity to be heard at a hearing where the government requests a court order.
In People v. Burkert, 7 Ill. 2d 506, 131 N.E.2d 495 (1955), the witness was
present at the trial court hearing but was denied counsel. The order was
issued and on appeal from a judgment of contempt for witness's refusal
to testify, the question raised was whether it was error for the witness to be
denied counsel. The supreme court, however, did not decide the question
because the witness had been represented by counsel on a subsequent motion
to vacate the trial court order.
Contra, Licata v. United
87 In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
States, 429 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 400 U.S. 938
(1970). In Licata, the court stated that "issuance of such an order is a
ministerial act requiring neither notice nor a hearing." Id. at 1179. The
court attempted to distinguish Bart by the difference in statutes considered
by the two courts.
88 In re McElrath, 248 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The court cited FED.
R. Civ. P. 24(a), Intervention of Right, which is similar to ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, § 26.1 (1971).
83416

84 Id. at 796, n.5.
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application and that questions as to relevance of specific evidence
must be determined at any subsequent contempt proceedings. 8
To What Crimes Does Immunity Extend?
There is another problem peculiar to the Antitrust Act and
not applicable to other Illinois immunity provisions. The Antitrust Act provides that "no individual shall be criminally prosecuted or subjected to any criminal penalty under this Act."' 0
Thus, if "under this Act" refers to "criminally prosecuted" a
witness is given immunity only as to prosecutions under the Act,
and the state is clearly limited in its power to compel answers.
The witness may successfully assert his privilege as to testimony
which would incriminate him under any other statute since immunity provisions of the Antitrust Act wQuld not be applicable.1
However, the Act also provides that no. individual shall be
excused on grounds of self-incrimination. 2 Under such contradictory provisions, the Illinois rule seems to be that unless
immunity extends to all prosecutions, an immunity provision
would not only be ineffectual, but unconstitutional as requiring
self-incrimination where there was no provision for immunity.
Therefore, consistent with judicial policy to construe such statutes as valid, if possible, it is held that immunity extends to all
prosecutions.9 3 Curiously, such provisions were once considered
as being consistent and the statutes were considered valid,
though limited in effect.9 4 Hence, under the Crawford policy of
limiting immunity, it is not inconceivable that the old rule may
once again emerge, and a witness may find himself protected
only as to antitrust prosecutions. Under such circumstances a
witness would have to carefully weigh each answer to determine
whether it may expose him to other prosecutions. If so, he must
refuse to answer.
CONCLUSION

In view of the lack of conformity among Illinois immunity
provisions, the ambiguity of many of the provisions, the somewhat confusing Crawford opinion, and the sanctioning of use
and derivative use immunity in Kastigar,it seems an appropriate
time to review and revise witness immunity statutes in Illinois.
89

The questions to be decided at this hearing, of course, vary according

to the language of the provision in question.
90 § 60-7.7 (see note 19 supra and accompanying text) [emphasis added].
All other Illinois immunity provisions extend immunity to any matter concerning which the witness has testified.

91 People v. Argo, 237 Ill. 173, 86 N.E. 679 (1908).
92 § 60-7.7, set out in full at note 19 supra and accompanying text.
9 People v. Boyle, 312 Ill. 586, 144 N.E. 342 (1924).
94 People v. Argo, 237 Ill. 173, 86 N.E. 679 (1908).
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Of primary importance is clearly setting forth in the provision
itself all requirements the witness must meet, and making all
provisions intended to achieve the same effect, uniform in language.
The following are suggested as essential elements of any
immunity provision:
1. Use and Derivative Use Immunity - All but one of
Illinois' immunity provisions grant transactional immunity.
It is recognized that it may be desirable in some instances to
encourage the unwilling witness to be more cooperative by
granting him transactional immunity. However, as a general
proposition, there seems to be no good reason why the state
should grant more protection than necessary. Grants of
transactional immunity should be limited to grand jury investigations and criminal prosecutions.
2. Claim of Privilege - Claim should be expressly required both for the protection of the witness and the government. Its inclusion will prevent surprise of the witness where
the court implies the requirement, and surprise of the government where the witness unexpectedly gives incriminating
testimony and thereby acquires immunity under a provision
which does not require the claim.
3. Court Order and Hearing - A hearing, at which the
witness will have an opportunity to be heard, should be provided to determine whether an order granting immunity and
compelling the witness to testify should issue.
4. Oath and Subpoena - Requirement of oath is desirable so that the witness testify under threat of a potential
perjury charge. Subpoena is unnecessary where claim of
privilege is required. However, given the courts' tendency
to require both by reference to other provisions of the statute
which contains the immunity provision, it may be best to
expressly require both.
Absent statutory revision, however, the witness called upon
to testify in an investigation where some immunity provision is
applicable faces the danger of unwittingly aiding the government
in subsequent prosecutions against him. He can never be too
cautious.
Stephen R. Swofford

